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BILLY BUDD AND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
MANDATES 
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS* 
The autlwr examines the picture of British naval 
justice in the era of the Napoleonic Wars, as presented 
in the motion picture BiUy Budd. The film portrays a 
contrast between what justice demands of those enforc-
ing the law and what the law itself demands of those 
officers. It is argued that the same contrast is present 
in what justice demands of federal judges and what 
mandatory sentencing requires of those judges and that 
society should learn a lesson from Melville's novel and 
the film that hard and fast rules, at the expense of 
justice, impose a cost it may not want to bear. 
BiUy Budd, l the fIlm version of Hennan Melville's novel 
BiUy Budd, Foretopman, opens with an encounter at sea be-
tween two square-rigged sailing ships. The era is that of the 
Napoleonic Wars and the pursuing ship is the British Royal 
Navy fighting ship Avenger. The pursued, however, is not a 
French warship, but is instead the British merchantman Rights 
of Man. The pursuit of one British ship by another is explained 
by the law of impressment. A British warship sailing shorthand-
ed had the authority to take seamen off any other British ship 
and impress them into naval service. Avenger is shorthanded 
and forces the Rights of Man to heave to and receive a board-
ing party. The crew of the merchantman is called to muster for 
inspection by the boarding officer, but one seaman has been 
sent up the mast in hopes that he will not be seen. The officer 
spots Billy Budd in the rigging and finds him to be the only one 
fit for service in the Royal Navy. 
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma AB., Franklin & Marshall College; 
M.S., M.A, Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan. 
1. (AngbAllied 1962). 
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Billy says goodbye to the Rights of Man, both literally and 
figuratively, as he is taken to the Avenger. There he enters a 
world quite different from that which he has known. It is a 
world of harsh discipline with little in the way of procedural 
protection. The crew is regularly called upon to witness 
floggings, but there is never an explanation of the offenses in-
volved. The crew lives in fear of the Master-at-Anns, Mr. 
Claggart, a man of great evil, who treats the crew cruelly and is 
hated by them. The officer corps, Captain Vere and Lieutenants 
Seymour, Ratcliffe and Wyatt, appear to be men of more com-
passion than Claggart, but do little to insulate the crew from 
Claggart's evildoing. 
Budd and Claggart seem almost incapable of comprehend-
ing each other. Budd does not see the evil in Claggart, but in-
stead seems to sense a loneliness. Claggart cannot take Budd 
as the embodiment of good that he is. Budd's goodness seems 
universally recognized by his shipmates on the Rights of Man 
and is soon recognized by his new shipmates and even his new 
officers, but Claggart does not know what to make of him. He 
cannot tell whether Budd's lack of hatred for him is due to 
naivete or if Budd is consciously serving as an ironic counter-
point to Claggart's evildoing. Once he recognizes the good in 
Budd, he determines to destroy him. 
The precipitating event occurs when Claggart forces an ill 
seaman to go up the mast for a sail change. The seaman, 
Jenkins, falls from the spar to his death. The crew's fear of 
Claggart turns to hatred, and Kincaid, another seaman, curses 
Claggart from the rigging. When the crew comes down from the 
masts, Kincaid is placed under arrest. Budd backs up Kincaid's 
accusation that Claggart knew Jenkins was ill when he was 
sent aloft. Captain Vere, while taking no action against 
Claggart, clearly believes Budd. He sentences Kincaid to only 
ten lashes, rather than the one hundred suggested, almost de-
manded, by Claggart. 
Claggart, either sensing the need for bold action to save his 
position or intent on going out in a blaze of evil, tells Captain 
Vere that he has learned that Billy Budd is leading a conspiracy 
to mutiny. The Captain, certain that Claggart is lying, calls for 
Budd and has Claggart repeat the charges to Budd's face. Budd 
is given the opportunity to deny the charges, but Budd has a 
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propensity to stammer when under strong emotion. He is un-
able to fmd his words, and as Claggart continues to harangue 
him, Budd strikes him a blow to the head, killing him. As 
Claggart lays on the floor of the Captain's cabin dying, there is 
a smirk on his face. He seems to take pleasure in the fact that, 
even though it has cost him his life, he has destroyed Budd. 
The ship's officers meet in secret Court-Martial. They are 
tom between a sense of justice that would take account of 
Budd's good and the evil that Claggart tried to do and a com-
mitment to the law that demands that Budd be condemned. 
Budd is found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. The crew 
assembles to witness punishment, and when they learn that 
Budd is to be executed, they almost mutiny. After last words of 
"God bless Captain Vere," Billy is hanged. At that moment a 
French warship appears from behind a point. The crew, still in 
a state of near mutiny, refuses for a time to respond to an or-
der to battle stations. The delay gives the French an advantage, 
and the Avenger is sunk. 
THE LEGAL IsSUES OF THE FILM 
There are various perspectives of BiUy Budd that provide 
for interesting analysis. The script, in identifying Billy as com-
pletely good and Claggart as completely evil, makes the film an 
obvious vehicle for an examination of the struggle between 
good and evil in the world. The two seem unable to coexist. 
One, in destroying the other, also destroys itself. Billy can also 
be seen as a Christ figure. Only through an act that costs him 
his life is the crew saved from the evil in its world. There are 
also overtones of possible homosexuality on the part of 
Claggart. He at one point says to Billy that many things are 
permitted of a handsome seaman that are denied his fellows. 
Dansker, the old sailmaker, also explains the malice that 
Claggart felt toward Budd as being based on Billy having a 
grace that Claggart could not possess. Claggart could not admit 
any homosexuality and may have been unable to accept it in 
himself, leading him to have to destroy the source of his temp-
tation and himself. 
While all these perspectives make for interesting thought, 
the subject of this essay is the vision of the law seen in the 
film, and BiUy Budd offers insights in this area as well. There 
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is, of course, the historical insight into the law of impressment 
and the rules under which the Royal Navy operated in the eigh-
teenth century. While of historical interest, these insights pro-
vide little of interest in a look at the nature of law in the cur-
rent era. Of far greater interest is the view of the role of the 
law and the relationship between law and justice expressed by 
the various characters in the film. These insights into what are 
timeless questions may provide a vehicle for an examination of 
the current role of law and present views on the relationship 
between law and justice. 
Interestingly, the film's first view on law was spoken by 
Claggart. He discussed with Captain Vere the proper punish-
ment for Kincaid for the curse directed toward him in front of 
the crew. Claggart thought one hundred lashes to be appropri-
ate, under the law, for such an outburst. Captain Vere, guided 
more by a sense of justice and knowing that Claggart deserved 
the curse, believed ten lashes to be just. Claggart suggested that 
justice is not the issue but that the rule of law was uppermost. 
He said to Captain Vere: "We must serve the law, Sir, or give up 
the right and privilege of service. It is only within that law that 
we may use our discretions according to our rank." Nonethe-
less, Vere exercised the discretion belonging to a captain to set 
punishment and, whether within the law or not, imposed the 
ten lashes. 
When Budd faced more serious charges, at his Court-Mar-
tial for striking and killing Claggart, Captain Vere's flexibility 
seemed to disappear. The court consisted of the First Lieuten-
ant Seymore, Second Lieutenant Ratcliffe and Third Lieutenant 
Wyatt. They heard Vere's testimony and Budd's, and quickly 
reached a unanimous conclusion that Budd should be acquitted 
on the basis of self-defense. The suggestion that self-defense 
applied in a situation in which the actor responded not to 
force, but to accusation, appears to be a strained attempt to 
reach a just conclusion. Vere spoke up before the members of 
the court could sign the acquittal. 
Since Vere had earlier told the court he was speaking as a 
witness and not a commanding officer, Seymour asked if he 
was continuing to speak as a witness or was now speaking as 
commanding officer. Vere responded: "As convening authority, 
Seymour. I summoned this court and I must review its findings 
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and approve them, before passing them on to the Admiralty." 
Seymour acceded: "Aye, Sir, that is your right." Vere responded: 
"No right. Which one of ~ here has rights? It's my duty and 1 
must perform it." 
Captain Vere had begun to separate his private self from 
the position he held and the duties that attended the rank. 
Again addressing'the court, he said: "[Y]our verdict sets him 
free and so would 1 wish to do, but are we free to choose as 
we would if we were private citizens? The Admiralty has its 
code. Does it care who Budd is, who you and 1 are?" Seymour 
argued that the Code cannot be inflexible: "We don't forget 
that, Sir, but surely even within that code each crime is differ-
ent. We can't ignore the facts." To this Vere responded that all 
that matters is the law, saying: "The facts. Come, you know the 
facts, which are the Mutiny Ad's provisions." 
Captain Vere seemed also to appeal to the fear that the 
crew would mutiny, whatever' decision they made, but that at 
least they would have done their duty if they found him guilty. 
The debate then returned to what appeared to be the real issue, 
whether law or justice was to control. Ratcliffe, responding to 
Vere's earlier point on the law being the only facts that matter, 
said: "I concede that, Sir, but this case is exceptional, and pity, 
if we are men, must move us, Captain." Vere responds: "So am 1 
moved, Ratcliffe, but we cannot have warm hearts betraying 
heads that should be cool." The law, it seems, is the law and it 
is the officers' duty to enforce its provisions without fail. 
Ratcliffe then turned to the issue of whether officers 
should, in their official capacity, be forbidden to act according 
to conscience. "Officers are only men in uniform. We have our 
standards, ethics, scruples." Vere would have none of this and 
responded: "When we first put this [uniform] on, we resigned 
our freedom. The gold we wear 'shows that we serve the King, 
the law. For the term of my active life, 1 am bound by an 
oath .... " Coming around to Vere's position on duty and the 
law, Ratcliffe suggested that at least the penalty be mitigated, 
but Vere would not grant even this, noting that the penalty was 
prescribed. While it is clear that Vere's feelings were with 
Budd, he simply would not be swayed by those feelings. "Our 
consciences are private matters, Ratcliffe, but we are public 
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men. Dare we give our consciences precedence over the code 
that made us officers and which called this case to trial? Dare 
we?" 
The last holdout on the court was the young Third Lieuten-
ant Wyatt. He objected to the position the court was reaching, 
saying he could not hang an innocent person, and asked to be 
excused. At this point it was clear that Seymour had accepted 
the Captain's view. He said: "Wyatt, we do not deal with justice 
here but with the law." Wyatt was unwilling to give up the ideal 
of justice and asked: "Was not the one conceived to serve the 
other?" The question was left hanging, as Vere instead respond-
ed to the request to be excused. Vere said: "Wyatt, can't you 
see that you must fIrst strip off the uniform you wear and then 
your flesh, before you can escape the case at issue here." Vere 
then asked Wyatt to show them a way to save the boy consis-
tent with their duty, saying "Save him, Wyatt, and you save us 
all." Wyatt could not. Vere expressed his feelings of "revulsion, 
shame, outrage" but did his duty and ordered the execution. 
While Vere and the other officers were tom between what 
is right or just and what is required by law, they eventually con-
cluded that it is the law that must control. Even when the law 
leads away from the path of justice, those who hold the posi-
tion as a result of the legal system owe their allegiance to the 
system and not to justice. The code is all important, and only 
private men and women can act according to conscience. 
BiUy Budd expresses an unappealing view of the law. It 
seems odd to suggest that sentences that are unjust must be 
imposed because, though unjust, they are demanded by the law. 
That may have been the way things worked in the Royal Navy 
of the 'eighteenth century, where one would be unlikely to look 
for a model legal system. Surely, however, in the modem era in 
a United States that asserts a commitment to justice, things 
must be different. One would think that our judges must not be 
forced into imposing unjust sentences, yet federal judges today 
are facing the same struggles with conscience that so troubled 
Captain Vere and his three Lieutenants. BiUy Budd is not just a 
window on some misbegotten era in legal history-it serves 
also as a mirror on our own times. 
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FEDERAL SENTENCING: REVIVING CAPTAIN VERE'S VERDICT 
The problem facing today's federal judge arises in a con-
gressional program to limit or remove judicial discretion in 
sentencing. The first major step in that process was the passage 
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.2 Congress was intent on 
reducing disparity in sentencing for federal crimes, and the way 
to do that seemed to be the reduction of judicial discretion in 
sentencing. The act established the United States Sentencing 
Commission charged with producing a set of Sentencing Guide-
lines. The Guidelines provide a system for the analysis of the 
important factors that make for a just sentence. The serious-
ness of the crime charged, the involvement and criminal history 
of the defendant, and the status or vulnerability of the victim 
are all quantified into a formula that results in a narrow sen-
tencing range. The guidelines do allow for a consideration of 
the character of the defendant and victim, a luxury that Billy 
Budd's judges lacked. Furthermore, the Guidelines allow the 
sentencing judge to depart from the sentence suggested by the 
Guideline. The departure has to be explained by an opinion and 
is subject to appeal. 
It was the second step in this process that contributed 
more to renew the problems presented by Billy Budd. In the 
six years following the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress adopt-
ed a get-tough policy toward crime. The result was a series of 
statutes providing mandatory minimum sentences for a variety 
of crimes of violence and a great number of drug crimes. In all, 
the United States Code now contains over one hundred manda-
tory sentencing provisions found in sixty different statutes.3 
Unlike the Sentencing Guidelines, the mandatory minimums do 
not take into account the characteristics of the defendant. De-
fendants of quite different character, who commit the same 
crime, receive the same sentence. This was the problem facing 
Billy's judges. Anyone killing a superior, without regard to the 
character or motivation of the defendant, was subject to execu-
tion. With no discretion, the court had to impose a sentence 
2. Pub. L No. 98473, 98 Stat 1987 (1984). 
3. see Stephen Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FoREST 
L REv. 199, 201 (1993). 
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that in the abstract might have seemed reasonable, but in light 
of the situation was unjust. The situation is similar with federal 
mandatory minimums.4 
Another difficulty with the mandatory minimums is that 
defendants who commit almost the same crime may receive 
vastly different sentences. Not only is injustice done by failing 
to recognize distinctions between defendants, injustice also 
results from unreasonable distinctions between crimes. For 
example, if one defendant is convicted of possession of 4.99 
grams of crack cocaine and another is convicted of possession 
of 5.01 grams of crack cocaine, the two would seem equally 
culpable. Under the minimum sentencing requirements, howev-
er, the first would face a maximum sentence of one year, while 
the second would face a mandatory minimum of five years. 
Faced with what seem to be unjust results, some federal 
judges have taken up Captain Vere's challenge to find a way to 
save the defendant. In a 1991 trial in federal court in Washing-
ton, D.C., Judge Stanley Sporkin found a way around what he 
seemed to believe to be an unjust sentence.5 The defendant 
was not a character as sympathetic as Billy Budd. He had a pri-
or drug conviction and had been found in possession of crack 
cocaine, a .357 Magnum, and a sawed-off shotgun. Because of 
those aggravating factors, he faced fifteen years imprisonment 
if he had possessed five grams of crack. If there had been less 
than five grams of crack, the penalty would be two to three 
years, with an additional five years for the firearm charge. The 
prosecution submitted evidence from a government laboratory 
that the. crack weighed 5.309 grams. The judge asked that the 
government have the crack reweighed, and the prosecution 
declined to do so, until threatened with contempt. On reweigh-
ing, the crack came in at 4.91 grams. The prosecution asked to 
be allowed to submit evidence on dehydration of the sample 
4. It is, in fact, possible for a defendant of worse character to receive a lesser 
sentence. An exception allows a shorter sentence for a defendant who testifies 
against others or provides law enforcement authorities with information useful in 
their investigation. It has been suggested that this exception, available only to those 
with valuable information, grants a benefit to ringleaders that is not available to 
those involved to a lesser degree. See itt. at 211-12. 
5. See Tracy Thompson, Drug Case Adds Meaning To Court's Scales of Justice, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1991, at Cl. 
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and the possible loss of weight as the result of chemical analy-
sis. The judge refused the offer. While the defendant was sen-
tenced to eight years and one month in prison, it was seven 
years less than the sentence would have been if the drugs had 
weighed one-tenth of a gram more. 
Other judges have taken up Lieutenant Wyatt's approach 
by stripping off the robe and quitting the federal bench. Per-
haps the most vocal in expressing the role of sentencing in his 
decision to leave the bench is United States District Judge J. 
Lawrence Irving of San Diego. Judge Irving, an appointee of 
President Reagan, said in announcing his resignation: 
I can't continue to do it-I can't continue to give 
out sentences that I feel in some instances are uncon-
scionable . . .. Every week, I get these cases of 
"mules"-most of them Hispanic-who drive drugs 
across the border. Ninety percent of the time they don't 
even know how much they're carrying-they met some-
body in a bar who paid them $500. If it's a couple of 
kilos, you hit these mandatory minimums and it's unbe-
lievable .... You're talking 10, 15, 20 years in prison.6 
Most judges, however, have followed the route laid down 
by Captain Vere. They have continued to do their duty, howev~ 
er distasteful they may find that duty. The anguish expressed 
by Captain Vere is matched by that recently expressed by Unit-
ed States District Judge J. Spencer Letts, also a Reagan appoint-
ee. While imposing a mandated ten-year sentence on a first-time 
drug offender, he attacked the law that required the sentence: 
Since the days when amputation of the offending 
hand was routinely used as the punishment for stealing 
a loaf of bread, one of the most basic precepts of crimi-
nal justice has been that the punishment fit the 
crime .... This is a principle which, as a matter of law, 
I must violate in this case. . . . I am no longer willing to 
apply this law without protest. 7 
6. Michael Isikoff & Tracy Thompson, Getting Too Tough on Drugs; Draconian 
Sentences Hurt Small Offenders More Than Kingpins, WASH. Posr, Nov. 4, 1990, at 
Cl. 
7. Jim Newton, Judge Derwunces Mandatory Sentencing Law Courts: Jurist 
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He said the case presented the "most difficult choice I have yet 
faced-between my judicial oath of office, which requires me 
to uphold the law as I understand it, and my conscience, which 
requires that I avoid intentional ir\iustice." Of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, he srud the system "is worse than uncivilized, it is 
barbaric. ,,8 
Judge Letts' view is widely shared in the judiciary. In a 
recent poll of federal and state judges, ninety percent of the 
federal judges responding expressed a belief that mandatory 
minimum sentencing provisions in federal drug law are a bad 
idea. 9 Two senior federal judges stated that they would refuse 
to impose drug sentences to avoid the Guidelines and mandato-
ry minimums, and about twenty percent of the federal judges 
smveyed said they had considered some action to protest the 
policies. lO Even Chief Justice Rehnquist has recognized the 
problems caused by the mandatory minimums, calling them 
"perhaps a good example of the law of unintended consequenc-
es."l1 The American Judicature Society has called mandatory 
minimums "a meat-ax approach to a task that demands fairness 
d . . "12 an precISIOn.... 
Despite this angst, federal judges, by and large, continue to 
side with the law over justice. They do so even though some 
seem to consider what they are doing to be morally wrong. 
"One federal judge . . . wondered, only half jokingly, whether in 
years to come he and his fellow jurists will have to assert the 
Nuremberg Defense-'I was only following orders'-to justify 
the number of people they are sending· to prison for de-
cades."13 The dilemma faced by Captain Vere and his Ueuten-
ants was not simply a product of the eighteenth century. Their 
problem was one that clearly has continued to trouble the law. 
Gives First-Time Drug Offender a 10-Year Term but Calls System that Imposes 
the Federal Guidelines "Barbaric," L.A TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1992, at Bl. 
8. Id. 
9. See The Verdict Is In: Throw Out Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Judges 
TeU A.B.A. Journal POU, ABA J., Oct. 1993, at 78. 
10. See id. 
11. Editorial: The Problem with Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 77 JUDICA-
TURE 124 (1993). 
12. Id. at 125. 
13. lsikoff & Thompson, supra note 6. 
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When a feature of the law had been recognized as a prob-
lem for as long as the competition between law and justice in 
sentencing has been, it is useful to look deeper into the law to 
find its source. On this point, the scholars of the Critical Legal 
Studies movement (the Crits) have offered an explanation. 
According· to the Crits, the law, not just sentencing but all of 
the law, is deeply conflicted. The conflict in each area is along 
the same lines as were present in the concerns expressed in 
sentencing Billy Budd and the modern drug offenders. On the 
one hand, there is a desire for hard, clear rules that inform the 
individual exactly what he mayor may not do and what penalty 
will be imposed for violation of the rules. Such rules provide 
the individual with a sense of autonomy in the freedom to act 
within the confines of the rules and a sense of certainty, both 
for the individual in knowing the penalty for violation, and for 
society in assurance that the law will be enforced against those 
that transgress. On the other hand, there is a desire for jus-
tice-a sense that the punishment should fit the actual crime as 
committed by the defendant and not just the crime as defmed 
by the law. 
Some of the Crits suggest that even this conflict is only 
reflective of an even deeper conflict in the psychology of each 
individual. They see a conflict between the desire for individu-
alism and the desire to belong to a community.· Mark Kelman 
suggests that hard rules are based on a stereotypical individual-
ism and that flexible standards-the appeal to justice-are 
based on the spirit of altruism and community.14 Rules are as-
sociated with a commitment to theory, while standards are 
allied with facts, intuition and a relationship of trust and 
care. 15 This dichotomy explains the victory of the rules ap-
proach in Congress and in the BiUy Budd era Admiralty. The 
theorists attempt to develop a series of rules that they expect 
to be applied in all situations. After all, a theory should predict 
or provide for all outcomes. It also explains the concerns ex-
pressed by those who must actually pass sentence. Judges see 
14. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STunIES 59 (1987). 
15. See id. at 60. 
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the facts. They have intuitions with regard to a just sentence. 
They see the individual situations Ul\iustly grouped together by 
meat-ax rules. 
Billy Budd shows the unacceptability of resolving the con-
flict between rules and standards by resting solely on a system 
of rules. Captain Vere did not have the discretion to impose a 
just sentence and was forced to have Billy hanged. Federal 
judges fmd themselves in the same predicament in some drug 
cases. The "War on Drugs" has led Congress to impose harsh 
and inflexible rules. Congress has determined to do battle with 
what is a serious problem, but it should be remembered that as 
Captain Vere said: "Battle makes a mockery of justice." 
What Billy Budd teaches us is that rules must be tempered 
by' the requirements of justice in individual cases. Billy Budd's 
execution is, unfortunately, a lesson that mandatory minimum 
sentencing shows we have yet to learn. The result of that fail-
ure is a sense, even on the part of those who pronounce sen-
tence, that the law and justice have parted way. On a more 
concrete level it has led to a situation in which the federal 
prison population has doubled since 1980, with more drug pris-
oners incarcerated now than the entire prison population in 
1980.16 The mandatory sentences attending drug convictions, in 
both federal and state systems, have led to prison overcrowding 
and sometimes the release of violent criminals to make room 
for those serving mandatory drug sentences. Inflexibility is 
causing the system to founder, and if the problems of withhold-
ing all discretion from judges are not recognized, the system of 
justice and corrections may well face the same fate as the 
Avenger. 
16. See Dan Bawn, Tunnel Vision: The War on Drugs, 12 Years Later, A.BA J., 
Mar. 1993, at 70, 71. 
